Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Salt Lake
County : Unknown
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James B. Lee; Kent W. Winterholler; Pasons, Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Respondent.
David W. Wilkinson; Attorney General of Utah; Maxwell A. Miller; Assistant Attorney General;
David E. Yocom; Salt Lake County Attorney; John G. Avery; Special Assistant/Legal Counsel; Bill
Thomas Peters; Special Deputy County Attonrey; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Salt Lake County, No. 870047.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1598

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

DfJCUM*-Nl
KFU
45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

BRIEF

S7fia&+BN, P E T E R S , STYLEB & P R O B S T
ATTORNEYS AT UW

GERALD H. KINGHORN
BILL THOMAS PETERS
HARRIET E. STYLER
GREGORY L. PROBST

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
E X C H A N G E PLACE, SUITE IOOO
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H 84iii

May 2 5 , 1990

TELEPHONE (801)
FACSIMILE (801)

36A-S644364--4^48

FILED
MAY 2 9 1990
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Mr. Geoffrey Butler, Clerk
Supreme Court of the State of Utah
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
RE:

Salt Lake County v. Kennecott Corporation,
Appeal No. 87-0047

Dear Mr. Butler:
On Thursday, the 24th day of May, 1990, I delivered to
the Supreme Court a letter, pursuant to the provisions of Rule
24J of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
In that letter, I referenced a recent Supreme Court
Decision but, through inadvertence, failed to attach a copy of
that Decision with the letter. I am supplying herewith ten (10)
copies of that Decision, and would request that you please place
a copy of the Decision in each of the Judge's boxes, along with
the letter heretofore delivered.
I apologize for any inconvenience this may cause you.
Thanking you in advance for your kind and courteous
cooperation, I remain
Very
CINGHORN,

hw
Enclosure
cc: James B. Lee, Esq.
Maxwell W. Miller, Esq.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, State of Utah,
Petitioner,
y.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH ex
rel. Sunkist Service Company,
Respondent.
No. 870261
FILED: March 19, 1990
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
David E. Yocom, Bill Thomas Peters, Salt
Lake City, for Salt Lake County
David L. Wilkinson, Michael F. Skolnick, Salt
Lake City, for State Tax Commission
Philip C. Pugsley, Salt Lake City, for Sunkist
Service Company
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
STEWART, Justice:
This case is here on a petition filed by the
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization to
review an order of the Utah State Tax Commission which held that real property belonging to Sunkist Service Company was not
subject to reassessment by Salt Lake County
as an "escaped assessment" under Utah Code
Ann. §59-5-17 (1974), even though a building on the real property had not been included in the assessment.
The County's 1984 assessment notice for
the subject property did not show any improvements on the property. However, a building on the property was under construction
and was 85 percent complete. That building
was lawfully assessable in the 1984 property
tax assessment. The 1984 owner of the subject
property timely paid the 1984 taxes based on
the underassessment.
In 1985, the owner sold the property to
Sunkist, and in purchasing the property,
Sunkist, relying on the tax rolls, assumed that
the 1984 taxes had been fully paid.
In 1985, the County discovered that the
building had not been included in the 1984 tax
assessment. The County then assessed additional taxes under Utah Code Ann. §59-517 (1974) (presently Utah Code Ann. §59-2309 (Supp. 1989)), which authorized counties
to collect past taxes where property had
escaped assessment. The additional taxes for
the building amounted to $46,296.69. Sunkist

protested the assessment to the State Tax
Commission. The Commission ruled that the
property had not escaped assessment, but had
only been undervalued, and therefore could
not be reassesssed.
The issue is whether buildings not assessed
in the tax assessment of the underlying land
are considered to have escaped assessment or
whether the entire property is considered to be
undervalued. Section 59-5-17 allows the
subsequent assessment of escaped property by
providing:
Any property discovered by the
assessor to have escaped assessment
may be assessed at any time as far
back as five years prior to the time
of discovery, and the assessor shall
enter such assessments on the tax
rolls in the hands of the county
treasurer or elsewhere....
Utah Code Ann. §59-5-17 (1974).
Our task is to define the term "escaped
assessment," as used in §59-5-17. Since
this is a legal question, we give no deference
to the Commission's construction of the
statute. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt
Lake County v. Nupetco Assocs., 779 P.2d
1138, 1139 (Utah 1989); Hurley v. Board of
Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524,
527 (Utah 1988).
Sunkist argues that the relevant taxable
property is one unit of property consisting of
the dependent components of land and improvements. Under this view, the entire property
was undervalued and hence is not subject to
reassessment. In support of this position,
Sunkist asserts that land and improvements
are subject to only one tax lien and are not
treated by the tax laws as independent types of
property. See Utah Code Ann. §59-10-3
(1974) (presently §59-2-1325 (Supp. 1989)).
On the other hand, the County asserts that
the land and the improvements are independent units of property and that the assessment
and taxation of only one does not preclude
subsequent assessment and taxation of the
other as an escaped assessment. The basis of
the County's argument is the language in
Utah Code Ann. §59-5-1 (Supp. 1985),
which required that land and improvements be
separately assessed.
The question of whether unassessed improvements on assessed real property may be
reassessed has been addressed in other jurisdictions. Some adopt the theory that Sunkist
asserts here, that the land and the improvements thereon constitute one unit of taxable
property. State v. Mortgage-Bond Co. of
New York, 224 Ala. 406, 140 So. 365 (1932);
Westward Look Dev't Corp. v. Department
of Revenue, 138 Ariz. 88, 673 P.2d 26 (Ct.
App. 1983); Whited v. Louisiana Tax
Comm'n, 178 La. 877, 152 So. 552 (1934); Leyh
v. Glass, 508 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1973).
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Other states adopt the County's theory that
land and improvements are independent types
of property for reassessment purposes. Chew
v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 673 P.2d
1028 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Korash v. Mills,
263 So. 2d 579 (Ha. 1972); People ex rel.
McDonough v. Birtman Electric Co., 359 111.
143, 194 N.E. 282 (1934); Mueller v. Mercer
County, 60 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1953). Alaska
has permitted reassessment when only some of
the improvements were omitted from the assessment. Municipality of Anchorage v. Alaska
Distributors Co., 725 P.2d 692 (Alaska 1986).
The general rule has been that "where a
valid assessment has been made by an assessor
cognizant of the facts, undervaluation is ordinarily not a ground for another assessment. *
Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne,
22 Utah 2d 172, 173-74, 450 P.2d 97, 98
(1969); see Union Portland Cement Co. v.
Morgan County, 64 Utah 335, 230 P. 1020
(1924). The Court recently reaffirmed this
principle in County Board of Equalization of
Salt Lake County v. Nupetco Associates, 779
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1989), which held that an
erroneous acreage figure on the assessment
rolls resulted in an undervaluation of the
property and not an escape from assessment.
The Court did not allow the assessor to reassess the property in light of the correct acreage
figure.
We first considered the issue of what the
term "escaped assessment" means in Union
Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan County, 64
Utah 335, 230 P . 1020 (1924). There, the
taxpayer failed to include several improvements in the statement which it transmitted to
the assessor, and the property was assessed
based on the erroneous description of the
property. After the time for making regular
assessments had elapsed, the assessor discovered that certain improvements had not been
included in the assessment. The Court relied
on a predecessor provision to §59-5-17 and
held that the assessor could reassess the property. 64 Utah at 341-42, 230 P. at 1022-23
(citing Comp. Laws Utah §5908 (1917)*).
In Union Portland Cement, the omission of
the improvements was the fault of the taxpayer, while in the present case, the omission
was the fault of the assessor. That distinction,
however, is not material to the issue of
whether the property had escaped assessment.
Union Portland Cement is not inconsistent
with §59-5-17, the escaped property statute
that governs this case. Utah Code Ann. §595-17 provides, "Any property discovered by
the assessor to have escaped assessment may
be assessed at any time as far back as five
years prior to the time of discovery." The
word "property" as used in §59-5-17 was
defined in §59-3-1 (1974) (presently §592-102 (Supp. 1989)): "Property means property which is subject to assessment and taxation according to its value ...." Improvements
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were independently subject to taxation and
assessment as property according to the statutory definition in §59-3-1. In 1983, §595-1 provided, "Land and the improvements
thereon must be separately assessed." In short,
the tax statutes in effect recognized land and
improvements as separate, or constituent,
elements of real estate, each element being
subject to assessment and taxation.
In this case, the initial assessment for 1984
had no description of the building. One having
only a very general knowledge of the land
would know from the face of the assessment
notice that the building had not been assessed.
Therefore, the building escaped assessment,
and the County is not barred from assessing
and taxing the building.
The arguments made by Sunkist and relied
upon by the Commission are not supported by
the tax statutes. Rather, the statute Sunkist
cites is further evidence that land and improvements are separately taxed. See Utah Code
Ann. §59-10-3 (1974) (presently §59-21325 (Supp. 1989)). Section 59-10-3 speaks
of property and improvements separately.
Sunkist argues that it is inequitable to hold
it responsible for taxes which accumulated
prior to its ownership of the property and
which were not assessed until after ownership
was transferred to it, despite the longstanding doctrine that property taxes are assessed against the property, not the property
owner. Sunkist also argues that because it
relied on tax rolls which showed no delinquent
taxes at the time Sunkist purchased the property, the County should be estopped from
collecting the escaped taxes.
But the question is not one of estoppel or
perceived inequity; it is, rather, one of statutory construction. In any event, Sunkist had
constructive notice that the building had not
been assessed. The complete absence of any
valuation for the building on the tax roll or
assessment notice was clear notice to Sunkist
that the building was subject to an escaped
property assessment. It is not unreasonable to
charge purchasers of real property with such
notice as is provided by the separate listing of
land and improvements on the tax rolls.
Generally, if a separate assessment appears in
the notice of assessment for both the land and
for the improvements, a purchaser may rely
on the assessment as being correct. Those
assessments are not subject to correction by
reassessment because they are not escaped
properties. When Sunkist examined the tax
rolls prior to purchase of the property, it
should have noticed that no improvement was
assessed and should have made appropriate
inquiry. In addition to using available information, buyers and sellers can easily avoid the
risk of escaped property tax liability by a
contract provision or deed covenant requiring
a seller to assume such liability.
Thus, for an improvement to qualify as an
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escaped property rather than an underassessed
property, the tax assessment notice must not
list the improvement. If the improvement is
underassessed but shown on the assessment
notice, the statute prohibits the reassessment
of the improvement. It was on that principle
that Nupetco was decided. 779 P.2d 1138. In
Nupetco, an assessment was made based on
6.607 acres in the parcel rather than the 9.607
acres that were actually in the parcel. The land
was described incorrectly on the tax roll, but
the Court held that the property had not
escaped assessment. That is not this case.
In this case, the building escaped assessment
since it was not listed on the 1984 assessment
notice.
Reversed.

ments had been paid for the years
in question. If improvements constitute omitted property within
§2439 [authorizing county assessor
to pick up escaped property], a
purchaser for value might acquire
the property believing that all taxes
had been paid. The property might
then be subjected to a lien for taxes
for years prior to the date of purchase due to the fact that certain
improvements had not been assessed
and taxed during prior years. The
fact that the legislature failed to
provide any protection for subsequent purchasers indicates that the
legislature did not intend to establish improvements as a separate
class of real property which could
WE CONCUR:
constitute omitted property within
Gordon R. Hail, Chief Justice
§2439 in situations where the land
Russell W. Bench, Court of Appeals Judge
itself had been assessed and taxed.
The majority cites decisions from Colorado,
1. Section 5908 provided, "Any property discovered Florida, North Dakota, and Illinois which
by the assessor to have escaped assessment may be
hold that improvements upon land may conassessed at any time, and when so assessed shall be
reported by the assessor to the auditor, and the stitute escaped or omitted property even
auditor shall charge the county treasurer with the though the land itself has been assessed and
taxes on such property, and the treasurer shall give taxed. Chew v. Board of Assessment Appeals,
City and County of Denver, 673 P.2d 1028
notice to the party assessed therewith."
(Colo App. 1983); Korash v. Mills, 263 So. 2d
579 (Fla. 1972); Mueller v. Mercer County, 60
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: (Dissenting)
N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1953); People ex rel.
I dissent. After reading and analyzing the
McDonough v. Birtman Electric Co., 359 111.
cases on this subject, I conclude that the better143, 194 N.E. 282 (1934). However, in none
reasoned cases support the rule that where the
of those cases had ownership of the property
legislature has made no provision to protect
changed between the time of the payment of
good faith purchasers of real property from
the taxes based on the original assessment and
liability for back assessments on omitted
improvements, the court will not interpret an discharge of the lien and the later assessment
"omitted or escaped property" statute, such as of omitted improvements. Moreover, as obsour Utah Code Ann. §59-5-17 (1974) (now erved by the Oklahoma court in Leyh v. Glass,
Utah Code A n n . §59-2-309(1) (1989 508 P.2d at 263, in the majority of those
Supp.)), to allow the assessor to pick up cases the court noted that the statutory scheme
omitted improvements-when the land on provided that no charge could be made for
which they are affixed was on the tax rolls and years prior to the date of ownership of the
the taxes originally assessed have been paid person owning the property at the time the tax
and the tax lien fully discharged. This rule was liability for omitted property was ascertained.
followed in Leyh v. Glass, 508 P.2d 259, 263 Such statutory protection exists in at least two
(Okla. 1973), and in Westward Look Develo- of the states: Illinois, People ex rel. McDonpment Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 138 ough v. Birtman Electric Co., 359 111. at 148,
194 N.E. at 284; and North Dakota, Mueller
Ariz. 88, 90, 673 P.2d 26, 28 (Ariz. App.
v.
Mercer County, 60 N.W.2d at 681-82.
1983).
Protection is also afforded in Kansas, NickeIn the Oklahoma case, the court correctly
lson v. Board of County Comm'rs of the
observed:
County of Lyon, 209 Kan. 53, 58, 495 P.2d
In Oklahoma taxes upon real
1015,1019(1972).
property constitute a lien upon the
The North Dakota decision rests primarily
property [statutory citation
on a statute of that state which provides for
omitted]. Parties dealing with real
the assessment of property which has escaped
estate and titles thereto are charged
"in whole or in part." 60 N.W.2d at 681-82.
with notice of the tax liens created
We have no counterpart in Utah. The North
by law. Akard v. Miller, 169 Okla.
Dakota court distinguished its statute from
584, 37 P.2d 961. In cases such as
statutes in South Dakota and Minnesota which
the present case, the tax rolls would
like Utah's authorize later assessment of "any
indicate that all taxes assessed
property" which has escaped earlier assessagainst the property and improveUTAH
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ment. In those two states, improvements, e.g.,
buildings, which were omitted may not be
later assessed if the land to which they were
affixed was on the tax rolls. Palmer v. Beadle
County, 70 S.D. 99, 102, 15 N.W.2d 6, 7
(1944); Davidson v. Franklin Ave, Inv. Co.,
129 Minn. 87, 89-90, 151 N.W. 537, 538
(1915). Since Utah's statute, section 59-2309(1), is unlike North Dakota's, but like
statutes in South Dakota and Minnesota, those
cases are persuasive here. The Colorado Court
of Appeals' decision in Chew v. Board of
Assessment Appeals, City and County of
Denver, 673 P.2d 1028 (Colo. App. 1983),
relied upon by the majority, is unpersuasive
since the court only stated its conclusion. Its
opinion contains no analysis of the issue.
In addition to the foregoing cases from
Oklahoma, Arizona, South Dakota, and
Minnesota, cases from Alabama and Louisiana support the rule that the assessor cannot
make a subsequent assessment of improvements affixed to land when the land was on the
tax rolls and the originally assessed taxes have
been paid. Srate v. Mortgage-Bond Co. of
New York, 224 Ala. 406, 408, 140 So. 365,
367 (1932); Whited v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n,
178 La. 877, 880, 152 So. 552, 553 (1934).
I strongly disagree with the majority opinion
that
Sunkist had constructive notice that
the building had not been assessed.
The complete absence of any valuation for the building on the tax
roll or assessment notice was clear
notice to Sunkist that the building
was subject to an escaped property
assessment. It is not unreasonable
to charge purchasers of real property with such notice as is provided
by the separate listing of land and
improvements on the tax rolls.
Generally, if a separate assessment
appears in the notice of assessment
for both the land and for the improvements, a purchaser may rely on
the assessment as being correct.
Those assessments are not subject
to c o r r e c t i o n by reassessment
because they are not escaped properties. When Sunkist examined the
tax rolls prior to purchase of the
property, it should have noticed
that no improvement was assessed
and should have made appropriate
inquiry. In addition to using available information, buyers and sellers
can easily avoid the risk of escaped
property tax liability by a contract
provision or deed covenant requiring a seller to assume such liability.
This statement is unrealistic. Sunkist did not
have constructive notice that the building had
not been assessed since there was nothing on
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the tax rolls to show that any building was on
the land on January 1, 1984. Only an inquiry
extrinsic to the tax rolls would have revealed
that. There is not "constructive notice" when
an inquiry extrinsic to the public record is
necessary.
The realities of purchasing real property in
this state are that the seller provides the buyer
with a policy of title insurance. Since in Utah,
as in Oklahoma and Arizona, property taxes
are a lien against real property, the title
insurer checks the records in the county treasurer's office to ascertain if there are any liens
for delinquent taxes owing. If there are none,
the insurer certifies to that effect. The title
policy insures only against delinquent taxes
which have been assessed but unpaid at the
time the policy is issued. Undoubtedly in the
instant case, Sunkist received such a title
policy. However, if the county assessor is
allowed to later make another assessment to
pick up improvements which may have been
omitted, a purchaser has no protection from
his title insurer because those subsequent taxes
had not been assessed and were not unpaid
when the title policy was issued.
The majority not only requires the purchaser or the title insurer to ascertain that there
were no delinquent taxes owing, but also
would require the purchaser or the title insurer
to examine the records in the assessor's office
as to whether both land and improvements
had been assessed for the past five years. It
would not be enough that the parcel of real
estate with its legal description was on the tax
rolls for those years. It takes little imagination
to foresee the following problems in that
procedure.
First, it is the seller who customarily furnishes the title insurance and chooses the title
insurer. It is not in his financial interest to go
outside the tax records to ascertain whether
there are grounds for a back assessment
should the assessor discover those grounds.
Second, if the buyer must inspect the assessment records, as the majority requires, the
buyer will also need to make an extrinsic
inquiry whether any buildings or improvements were on the land in any of the past five
years, and if a building were constructed
during that period of time, what the stage of
construction was on January 1 of the year
following the commencement of construction.
From whom does the purchaser get that information? The seller may not know if he has
not owned the property the entire five years.
In the instant case, the majority holds that
Sunkist had "constructive notice" that the
1984 assessment was erroneous because no
improvements were taxed. How was Sunkist to
divine the percentage of completion of construction on January 1, 1984, almost two years
before it purchased the property? Would the
majority allow Sunkist to rely on the sellers'
opinion or must Sunkist search out the
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builder? The majority places no responsibility
on the assessor in this process even though
Utah Code A n n . §59-2-303(2) (1987)
provides:
Assessors shall become fully acquainted with all property in their
respective counties, and, either in
person or by deputy,
regularly
update assessment records in order
to annually establish the values of
the property they are required to
assess.
(Italics added.) Moreover, under section 59-2306, the assessor may require an affidavit
from any person setting forth all the property
owned by him or her. That apparently was not
done here. Nor does the majority charge the
assessor with "constructive notice" of the
building permit on the public record for the
new building.
Third, even if a buyer buys vacant land, the
majority would charge him with the duty to
ascertain by extrinsic inquiry whether at any
time within the past five years there were
buildings or parts of buildings on the property
which were not assessed and have since been
demolished.
In sum, the burden placed by the majority
on purchasers of real property is fraught with
mischief and very unrealistic. The buyer must
now decide whether to spend the money necessary to make the inquiry extrinsic to the
county tax records or whether to "take his
chances." The suggestion of the majority that
buyers and sellers "can easily avoid" the risk
of a later assessment by providing by contract
or deed covenant that the seller will assume
such liability is again unsatisfactory. Once the
sale has closed, the funds are disbursed to the
seller, and the buyer takes possession, the
seller often leaves the state. If he does not
leave, a lawsuit may be necessary to collect,
which in some cases may be a small amount
such as the taxes on a residence for one year.
As a practical matter, the buyer will wind up
absorbing the loss rather than engage in litigation. As was observed by the Supreme Court
of Alabama in its opinion in State v. MortgageBond Co. of New York, 224 Ala. 406, 409,
140 So. 365, 368 (1932), "The public good
requires security of titles as well as just taxation and the law aims at both." Good faith
purchasers should be entitled to rely on the tax
records.
The majority finds support for its position
in the fact that in Utah, by statute, land and
any improvements thereon are separately assessed. I disagree that that fact makes any
difference. Several courts which subscribe to
the rule which I advocate have held that the
separate assessment is simply to aid the taxpayer and the assessor in arriving at a fair
evaluation of the land and improvements. It
does not make improvements a separate class

of property. Palmer v. Beadle Countyy 70
S.D. at 102, 15 N.W.2d at 7; State v. Mortgage-Bond Co. of New York, 224 Ala. at
409, 240 So. at 368; Leyh v. Glass, 508 P.2d
at 263. Taxpayers have the right to protest
what they consider an overvaluation. Since
land and improvements are appraised by different methods and standards, both the assessor and the taxpayer are assisted by separate
assessments. However, once the assessment
has been made, the tax rolls are sent to the
county treasurer for the application of the mill
levy to the total assessment. There, taxes are
computed on the combined value of the land
and improvements; one lump sum results. If a
partial payment is made, that payment is
applied on the total taxes without any breakdown between land and improvements. If the
taxes are not paid, eventually the county sells
the land and improvements together without
any breakdown. There is but one lien on the
property for the taxes owing on the combined
assessed values of land and improvements.
Clearly, the separate assessment of land and
improvements does not support the majority*s
position.
I also disagree with the majority that there
is comfort for its position in Union Portland
Cement Co. v. Morgan County, 64 Utah 335,
230 P. 1020 (1924). The majority has failed to
point out that in that case, there was no
change of ownership as in the instant case.
Furthermore, the taxpayer had furnished the
assessor with either a false or an obviously
incomplete statement of the improvements on
the property, and the omission was discovered
before the taxpayer paid his taxes for that
year. I have no quarrel with that decision, but
it is obvious that the facts are unlike those we
are confronted with here. It is true that in that
case we stated that the reason the property
was omitted was immaterial and that if property were omitted, it was the duty of the assessor to assess it. Since this Court did not
have before it a fact situation anything like the
facts with which we are now confronted, the dicta in Union Portland cannot be considered
to be authority for this more complex situation.
I would affirm the Utah Tax Commission.
Durham, Justice, concurs in the
dissenting opinion of Associate Chief Justice
Howe.
Zimmerman, Justice, having
disqualified himself, does not participate
herein; Bench, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.
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